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CHAPTER 7 
Wills, Trusts, and Administration of Estates 
j 
PAUL B. SARGENT 
t Nothing is so sure as death and taxes, unless it is the need for study 
, and review of the legal decisions which follow them. In the probate I field, wild oats sown at random fall upon fertile soil and the harvesting 
.. of each year's crop, however unpalatable, is the purpose of this chap-
ter of the SURVEY. 
, §7.1. Execution of wills. The fallacy of executing copies of wills 
... was brought home during the past year in Miniter v. Irwin} where 1 the probate of a duly executed carbon copy of a will was refused in 
• line with the presumption of destruction (and revocation) by the testa-j tor of the original will when it could not be found after his death. A far more serious consequence of executing a will in multiple form 
arises when, the fact of such execution being known, all the executed 
copies are not produced in court and the original will itself is disal-j lowed on the possible assumption that the testator destroyed one of the 
signed copies with intent to revoke the original. To quote from the 
Miniter decision: "And where a will is executed in duplicate, and 
the testator retains a copy which he destroys or cancels, or which can-
not be found after his death, there is at least a presumption that a 
revocation of the will was intended even though a duplicate is found 
in apparent good order in the hands of another." 2 
Care is a prime requisite in the drafting of wills, but in some in-
stances, as exemplified by the above, excessive caution may be the 
handmaiden to sterility. Copies of wills should be conformed, but not 
executed. 
§7.2. Spendthrift trusts. Nowhere in the crazy patchwork of pro-
bate are there more interesting cases to be found than those affecting 
spendthrift trusts. A celebrated debate by intellectual giants on the 
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§7.1. '1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 7, 116 N.E.2d 567. 
• 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 8, 11 6 ;'II.E.2d at 568. 
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social consequences of such trusts occurred as long ago as the 1870's,1 
and although paternalism seems to have won the day, the courts have, 
been ever alert to prevent settlors from being indulgent in their own 
favor. 2 This principle was extended during the survey year in the case 
of Ware v. Gulda,s in which an attorney who, at the behest of (and in 
behalf of) the settlor, had abortively tried to "break" an irrevocable, 
trust was permitted to tap the trust itself for the value of his services 
in the unsuccessful venture, even though the settlor was not within the 
jurisdiction of the Court and the payments of income or principal 
rested in the sole discretion of an independent corporate trustee. Set-
tlors of trusts can still wrap others with a protective financial cloak 
which they cannot wear themselves.4 
§7.3. Ancillary administration: Foreign-situated property. An in-
triguing situation arose in Lenn v. Riche.1 Suit was brought in Mas-
sachusetts (under French law) against an ancillary administrator, with 
the will annexed, in this state for the value of a fifteenth-century paint-
ing and some Renaissance medallions given by the deceased testator 
to the plaintiff-donee in Germany, who in turn had loaned the articles 
back to the testator-donor for safekeeping and display in Paris. It 
was held that the plaintiff-donee, who had taken up residence in Mas-
sachusetts, could recover in this Commonwealth from the ancillary ad-
ministrator the value of the painting and medallions, thus avoiding 
the difficulties and expense of proceeding in the testator's domicile in 
France. The efficacy of obtaining satisfaction from ancillaries has 
sometimes been overlooked by jurisdictional purists blinded by exag-
gerated conceptions of venue, and the Riche decision is a happy exam-
ple of a successful short cut to an equitable result. 
§7.4. Compensation, undue influence, and fiduciary relationships. 
The stimulating subject of compensation to members of the bar re-
ceived the attention of the Supreme Judicial Court, directly and indi-
rectly, in the companion cases of Reilly v. McAuliffe. 1 Indirectly, the 
Court refused to allow the probate of a codicil of a testatrix, enfeebled 
by age and disease, wherein her attorney was made residuary legatee 
in place of certain nieces, nephews, grandnieces, and grandnephews 
named in the will preceding the codicil. Despite findings that the 
testatrix was not legally incompetent and that the codicil was drafted 
by other counsel, it was held under the rule of "careful scrutiny" given 
to all such cases that the heavy duty resting on an attorney in all per-
sonal dealings with a client, plus the mere perfunctory services of "out-
§7.2. 1 Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 23 L. Ed. 254 (1875) pro; Gray, Restraints 
on the Alienation of Property (2d ed. 1895), decidedly con. 
2 Merchants National Bank v. Morrissey, 329 Mass. 601, 109 N.E.2d 821 (1953). 
31954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 73, 117 N.E.2d 137. 
• I Scott, Trusts §156 (1939); Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts §478 (2d ed. 1947). 
§7.3. '1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 115, 117 N.E.2d 129. 
§7.4. '1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 153, 117 N.E.2d 811; 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 157, 117 
N.E.2d 815. 
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side" counsel, added up to undue influence and precluded the residuary 
lawyer from taking under the codicil. The pronouncements against 
doing indirectly that which cannot be done directly have no better 
exemplification than in fiduciary relationships, and paramount among 
these is the relationship existing between trustee and beneficiary, the 
strict standards of which were restated during 1954 in Attorney General 
v. Flynn.2 
Returning to the Reilly decision and its relation to direct compensa-
tion, the Court did not hesitate to reduce a fee charged by the same 
luckless lawyer-legatee for acting as one of the conservators of the en-
feebled lady from $1500 to $400, since the period of conservatorship 
lasted only six weeks, the inventory of the ward disclosed personal prop-
erty of only $20,264.78, and the estimate of the hours expended seemed 
out of proportion to the time required to accomplish the work involved. 
Also, the Court dispelled any notion that multiple fiduciaries are en-
titled to multiple compensation. 
However, in Phelps v. State Street Trust CO.,3 discussed in Section 
7.7 infra, on another point, the Court, in commenting on total fees of 
$7700 to counsel and a guardian ad litem with respect to a petition 
for instructions, said: "Since there was no dispute of fact, and the ques-
tions of law are comparatively simple, the total seems large. Some of 
the beneficiaries object to the allowance. But the record contains no 
statement of the value of the trust. Without knowing its value, we 
cannot say that the amounts allowed were excessive." 4 
Language such as this, buttressed by what was said in National Shaw-
mut Bank v. Cummings,5 can be very helpful to members of the bar in 
setting fair and equitable fees. 
§7.5. Printed probate forms. The sanctity of printed probate forms 
received the Court's blessing in In re Lucey.! There, the petitioner for 
appointment as administrator had stricken out the words "or some 
other suitable person" from the prayer in the petition. The Court, in 
finding the striking was improper, said, "The printed forms of the 
Probate Courts are approved by this court . . . The Probate Courts 
themselves cannot change a form so approved. Obviously the peti-
tioner cannot." 2 It is suggested that the language of the case is 
"1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 473, 120 N.E.2d 296. 
• 330 Mass. 511, 115 N.E.2d 382 (1953). 
• 330 Mass. at 513, 115 N.E.2d at 383. 
5284 Mass. 563, 569, 188 N.E. 489, 492 (1933): "In determining what is a fair 
and reasonable charge to be made by an attorney for his services many considerations 
are pertinent, including the ability and reputation of the attorney, the demand for 
his services by others, the amount and importance of the matter involved, the time 
spent, the prices usually charged for similar services by other attorneys in the same 
neighborhood, the amount of money or the value of the property affected by the 
controversy, and the results secured. Neither the time spent nor any other single 
factor is necessarily decisive of what is to be considered as a fair and reasonable 
charge for such services." (Emphasis supplied.) 
§7.5. 11954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 315, 118 N.E.2d 762. 
21954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 315, 118 N.E.2d at 763. 
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broader than intended, as such an edict, if carried to extremes, would 
outlaw practical considerations and the public interest. 
§7.6. Recapture of trust transfers. The irretrievable nature of 
transfers in trust in the absence of proved fraud or an expressly reserved 
power of amendment or withdrawal is pointed up in Markus v. Mar-
kus.! A mother set up trusts with her two sons as trustees. One son 
thereafter (by amendment) became a beneficiary of the trust and ceased 
to be a trustee. The other son became sole trustee under a provision 
that his wife would succeed him as trustee in case of his death prior to 
his mother's. The inevitable occurred and the daughter-in-law became 
trustee. Trouble ensued. The mother claimed that payments made 
to her by a corporation owned by the trust did not constitute payments 
by the trust, and crying "fraud" she and her other children petitioned 
to have the trust terminated and the daughter-in-law charged. They 
failed, except to the extent of obtaining an order for an accounting 
and a restatement by the Court of the usual duties of a trustee. 
On the other hand, the Court is quick to afford relief to a settlor who 
has kept his or her toe in the door as a life beneficiary. In Chase v. 
Switzer2 a woman advanced in years and impaired in health executed 
a trust whereby she assigned to the trustee-petitioner all her personal 
property for her own and a son's (or his wife's) benefit, reserving an 
unrestricted power to amend or revoke. A few weeks later by amend-
ment she replaced the unlimited amendment clause with a provision 
retaining power to amend "that part of this trust which is effective 
during her lifetime," but waiving any right to amend, modify, or re-
voke that part of the trust "which is to become effective upon the death 
of the Donor." Subsequently she demanded by letter the return of 
certain savings bank accounts from the trustees. They refused on the 
ground that to return them would affect that part of the trust becom-
ing effective upon her death, i.e., the remainder passing to the son. 
The Court upheld the settlor's contention, saying, "However unfortu-
nate it may seem to the trustees that this elderly lady should be de-
prived of their protection as to more than half of her property, she 
acted within her rights, and they must respect her wishes." 3 The case 
is also interesting in that it touches upon the propriety of an appeal 
from a Probate Court decree by the trustees, who normally are not 
considered "persons aggrieved" by such a decree if it adequately in-
structs them as to their duties, however vehemently the trustees may 
disagree with such instructions.4 
§7.7. Amendment of trusts: Formalities. It is imperative that modi-
fications to even a freely amendable trust be made precisely in accord-
ance with the mandate of the trust. Thus, in Phelps v. State Street 
§7.6. '1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 443, 119 N.E.2d 415. 
"1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 327, 118 N.E.2d 749. 
81954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 328, 118 N.E.2d at 752. 
• See Newhall, Settlement of Estates §251 (3d ed. 1937); Dockary v. O'Leary, 286 
Mass. 589, 190 N.E. 798 (1934). 
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Trust Co.,! the Court refused to uphold a purported amendment by a 
written instrument signed by the settlor and delivered to the trustee 
but not acknowledged by the settlor as called for by the instrument of 
trust. It is obvious that such a result would be wholly incomprehensi-
ble to a layman, and therefore it behooves lawyers to protect their 
clients and the objects of their clients' bounty from the rigors of a 
technical rule comparable only to the precepts covering the execution 
of wills. 
§7.8. Ascendant contingencies and declaratory judgments. The 
case of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Quincy,! is discussed in the 
chapter on future interests,2 but the decision is also a guidepost for 
declaratory judgments in the law of trusts. The Trustees of Dartmouth 
College petitioned for a declaratory judgment (a present controversy 
having been admitted) on the question whether the city of Quincy was 
within its rights in reallocating to income certain accumulated income 
previously transferred to the corpus of a perpetual fund for educational 
purposes. The propriety of the petition was upheld under a provision 
in the testator's will reading as follows: "If the town of Quincy ... 
should surrender the property or should use it for any other purpose 
than contemplated in this will, then I bequeath the said property to 
the Trustees of Dartmouth College to be used by them, in the manner 
they may think best, for the promotion of science and literature." 3 
The Court, while recognizing the normally exclusive function of the 
Attorney General in seeing to the proper administration of general 
educational trusts, found that Dartmouth College had a special inter-
est in overseeing the maintenance of the fund. This is another object 
lesson in the right of persons with contingent interests to notice of 
proceedings affecting the trust, and their power to be heard in all such 
matters "unless, indeed such interests are so utterly unsubstantial as to 
amount to nothing more than a film of mist." 
§7.9. Trusts of real property and the Statute of Frauds. The 
Statute of Frauds concerning alleged trusts of real property continues to 
rise to plague the consciences of the courts, and in Herman v. Edington,! 
decided during the survey year, the justices probably went about as far 
as they could go in satisfying the statute and the plaintiff, though not 
the decedent's devisees. The decedent delivered to the plaintiff an 
envelope containing his (the decedent's) deeds to certain Florida real 
estate and inscribed, dated, and initialed on the envelope that the prop-
erty now belonged to the plaintiff in consequence of unreimbursed pay-
ments advanced by the latter to the decedent. Despite the fact that the 
decedent retained legal title to the property and paid the taxes thereon 
§7.7. '330 Mass. 5ll, ll5 N.E.2d 382 (1953). 
§7.8. '1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 243, ll8 N.E.2d 89. 
2 Section 3.4 supra. 
81954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 243, 245, ll8 N.E.2d 89, 91. 
§7.9. '1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 337, ll8 N.E.2d 865. 
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until his death, and notwithstanding the disquieting imponderable that 
the plaintiff was a woman with whom the decedent was on intimate 
terms without benefit of clergy, the Court found a valid trust of the 
real estate in the woman's favor. 
§7.10. Probate of wills: Notice to legatees and devisees. An enact-
ment during the survey year requiring notice to legatees and devisees 
following the probate of a will is deserving of special mention. Chapter 
465 of the Acts of 1954, effective September 1, 1954, amending General 
Laws, Chapter 192, Section 12, reads as follows: 
Within three months after the allowance of a will and the appoint-
ment and qualifications of an executor, it shall be the duty of the 
executor to notify by mail the devisees and legatees named in the 
will whose addresses are known to him that devises, legacies or be-
quests have been made to them and to file in the probate court an 
affidavit showing the names of those notified and the addresses to 
which notices were mailed. In case an administrator with the will 
annexed is appointed he shall have the same duty unless it has 
already been performed by an executor. 
The new section typifies the trend toward alerting persons interested 
in an estate, who will now receive required notices both before and 
after probate of a will, as well as a citation upon the presentation for 
allowance of an executor's account. 
§7.11. Safekeeping of distributive shares. Judicial notice of the 
Iron Curtain (see General Laws, Chapter 206, Section 27 A, enacted in 
1950) and the international aspects of probate law came into view in 
Massachusetts during 1954 when the Court, in Petition of Mazurowski,1 
upheld an order of the Probate Court requiring the petitioners, being 
nationals of Poland, to appear personally in court to claim their dis-
tributive shares in the intestate estate of the deceased husband and 
father of the claimants. The reasoning behind the decision is succinctly 
stated in one paragraph therefrom: 
The result of the best information we have been able to obtain 
is that there is no reasonable assurance that money sent to many of 
the countries behind the "Iron Curtain" will be received by the 
payees at full value, and that as to Poland, the payees would re-
ceive no more than about twenty per cent of full value, the remain-
ing eighty per cent being in effect confiscated by the Polish State.2 
§7.12. Miscellaneous statutes. In probate matters nearly every 
legislative enactment or judicial decision is significant. The following 
are therefore called to the attention of the reader. 
Chapter 465 of the Acts of 1954, effective September 1, 1954,1 permits 
a legatee to recover a legacy and enforce all rights in respect thereto by 
§7.11. '1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 35, 116 N.E.2d 854. 
"1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 40, 116 N.E.2d at 858. 
§7.12. 1 Amending G.L., c. 197, §19. 
6
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